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This
information is provided for educational and guidance purposes only. It
is not intended to constitute legal advice nor to substitute the need
for legal counsel. Entire contents Copyright 2005. Martin James
O'Connell.
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Adverse
Employment Actions in Ohio
- by
Martin J. O'Connell, Esq. |
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In order to prevail on a claim of employment
discrimination or retaliation, one of the elements a plaintiff must prove is
that she/he was subject to an “adverse employment action.” In cases
involving termination of employment, there is generally no dispute that the
employee was subject to a “materially adverse change in the terms and
conditions of employment.”[1]
However, not all employment discrimination claims allege termination. Nor is
discharge from employment the only recognized “adverse employment action.”[2]
An adverse employment action is
“[a] tangible employment action [that] constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.”[3]
The adverse action need not result in pecuniary loss, but must materially
affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment.
[4]
The definition of an adverse
employment action set forth Kocsis/Burlington Industries
is not exhaustive. In fact, due the
remedial nature of the laws under which most suits are brought (e.g., Title
VII, ADEA, ADA), the term is liberally construed. The courts have recognized
a number of adverse employment actions that satisfy the requisite element of
a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.
An “adverse employment action”
may also include:
·
significantly diminished material responsibilities[5]
·
demotions evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits[6]
·
disciplinary action in the form of a written warning in
certain situations[7]
or a formal reprimand[8]
·
non-selection for a vacant position[9]
·
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities[10]
·
a decision causing a significant change in benefits[11]
·
failure to renew a contract[12]
·
constructive discharge[13]
·
differential treatment in the compensation of similarly
situated employees during sick leave[14]
·
exclusion from meetings that directly affect the employee’s
ability to perform her job[15]
·
providing a negative reference to a potential employer[16]
·
“or other indices that might be unique to a particular
situation.”[17]
Despite the seemingly
open-ended list of events that may constitute an adverse employment action,
courts generally look beyond the action itself and examine its consequences.
Most decisions emphasize that the result of an alleged action must be
significant or material before it will be considered actionable.
In White v.
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.,
No. 00-6780 (6th Cir. 2004), the Court emphasized that
“[e]mployment actions that are de minimis
are not actionable under Title VII. . . A mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities or a bruised ego is not enough to
constitute an adverse employment action.” (Internal citations omitted). They
must rise above trivial workplace dissatisfactions.[18]
Among
the actions that courts have found to be not adverse include the following:
·
job reassignments without salary or work
hour changes do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment action[19]
·
lowered performance ratings without
reduced pay[20]
·
a verbal
reprimand absent
evidence that it is anything more than mere criticism[21]
·
negative statements in an employee’s
personnel file that do not result in an adverse action
·
temporary actions (e.g., suspension)
that do not result in a loss of income[22]
·
annoyances or inconveniences to the
employee
·
requiring an employee to work at home
following outpatient surgery[23]
·
rejecting computer expenses that
previously had been approved[24]
·
Transferring an employee whose pay, benefits, title and job
duties remain the same but new position is in another county so employee
will have to travel an additional 20 minutes to get to work[25]
It is important to remember that
proving an adverse employment action is only one hurdle a plaintiff must
overcome to support his claim. Claims for retaliation and discrimination
brought under Title VII and ADEA are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) burden-shifting framework. The analysis requires a
plaintiff first to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To
establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show (1) that [s]he is a
member of a protected group, (2) that [s]he was subject to an adverse
employment decision, (3) that [s]he was qualified for the position, and (4)
that [s]he was replaced by a person outside of the protected class. In
disparate treatment cases, the fourth element may be replaced with the
requirement that the plaintiff show she was treated differently from
similarly-situated individuals.[26]
Once the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to set forth a
non-discriminatory reason for the action. If the employer does so, the
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was merely a
pretext for discrimination.
The principal lesson the
decisions of the courts teach is that employers must make sure that
employment decisions and actions follow a consistently applied policy of
non-discrimination and no retaliation.
[1]
Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc.,
97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir. 1996).
[2]
In addition to the term “adverse employment action,” “tangible
employment action” is also frequently used. See, e.g., Pennsylvania
State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct.
2342 (2004).
[3]
Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc.
(6th Cir. 1996) 97 F.3d 876 quoting Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
[4]
Peterson v. Buckeye Steel Casings, 133 Ohio App.3d 715, 827 (Ohio
Ct. App. 10th 1999).
[5]
Hollins v. Atlantic Co. (6th Cir. 1999) 188 F.3d 652,
662 citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876,
886 (6th Cir. 1996).
[6]
Hollins v. Atlantic Co. (6th Cir. 1999) 188 F.3d 652,
662 citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876,
886 (6th Cir. 1996).
[7]
“Disciplinary action in the form of a written warning may constitute an
adverse employment action when the warning affects an employee's
opportunity for promotion and pay raises or may place the employee on
probation. Rose v. Buckeye Telesystem, Inc.,
181 F.Supp.2d at 776-777, citing Cunningham v. Kansas City
Star Co., 995 F.Supp. 1010, 1025 (W.D.Mo.
1998). The same is true if the warning affects or has an impact on
privileges associated with employment.” Id.,
citing Duran v. N.M. Dept. of Labor,
143 F.Supp.2d 1278, 1285 (D.N.M. 2001).
[8]
Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th
Cir. 2000).
[9]
Grooms v. Supporting Council of Preventative Effort,
157 Ohio App.3d 55, 2004-Ohio-2034
[10]
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)
[11]
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)
[12]
Csejpes v. Cleveland Catholic Diocese, 109 Ohio App.3d 533, 538
(Ohio Ct. App. 8th 1996).
[13]
Policastro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
297 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2002). However, in
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,
124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004) the Supreme Court clarified that a constructive
discharge is not an adverse employment action unless
it is the result of a change in status such as a humiliating demotion,
an extreme cut in pay or a transfer to a position with unbearable
working conditions. In Ohio, “[t]he test for determining whether an
employee was constructively discharged is whether the employer's actions
made working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person under
the circumstances would have felt compelled to resign.” Mauzy
v. Kelly Services, Inc., 75 Ohio
St.3d 578, (1996) paragraph four of the syllabus.
[14]
Tamayo v. Stack Container Serv.,
2004-Ohio-2161
[15]
Peterson v. Buckeye Steel Casings,
133 Ohio App.3d 715 (1999).
[16]
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 339, 346 (1997).
[17]
Kocsis at 886.
[18]
White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., No. 00-6780
(6th Cir. 2004).
[19]
Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th
Cir. 1996)
[20]
Hollins v. Atlantic Co.,
188 F.3d 652, __ (6th Cir. 1999)
[21]
Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court (C.A.6, 2000), 201 F.3d 784,
792.
[22]
Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456 (6th Cir.
2000).
[23]
Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough HealthCare Prod., 176 F.3d 921,
930 (6th Cir. 1999)
[24]
Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough HealthCare Prod., 176 F.3d 921, 930
(6th Cir. 1999)
[25]
Darnell v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 924 F.2d 1057 (6th
Cir. 1991).
[26]
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582, 583 (6th Cir. 1992).
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